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Viewing cable 09STATE25689,

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Understanding cables

Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cable's unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables ([browse by origin](#) to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this [WikiSource](#) article as reference.

Discussing cables

If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at the paragraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags **#cablegate** and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. **#09STATE25689**.

Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
09STATE25689	2009-03-18 13:20	2011-08-30 01:44	SECRET	Secretary of State

Appears in these articles:

<http://www.aftenposten.no/spesial/wikileaksdokumenter/article3988461.ece>

VZCZCXYZ0008
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHC #5689 0771338
ZNY SSSS ZZH
P R 181320Z MAR 09
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 0000
INFO MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME COLLECTIVE

S E C R E T STATE 025689

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/18/2034 TAGS: [PARM](#) [MTCRE](#) [PREL](#) [ETTC](#) [CH](#) [IR](#)

REF: A. 2008 BEIJING 189 AND PREVIOUS B. 2008 STATE 14066 C. 2008 BEIJING 481 D. 2008 BEIJING 609 E. 2008 BEIJING 716 F. 2008 BEIJING 886 G. U.

Classified By: ISN/MTR DIRECTOR PAM DURHAM FOR REASONS 1.4 (B), (D), AND (H).

1. (U) This is an action request. Embassy Beijing, please see paragraph 6.

2. (S) Background: Since February 2006, we have repeatedly shared with China our concerns regarding the proliferation-related trading activities.

3. (S) In November 2008 we advised the PRC that Karl Lee, the commercial manager of LIMMT, was planning a late October 2008 delivery of accelerometers.

4. (S) We now have additional information to share with Chinese officials regarding this matter. Specifically, we understand that as of late December 2008, SBIG continued to receive consignments of tungsten copper, graphite and aluminum.

5. (S) Objectives: We want to share this information with Chinese officials to make clear to them that LIMMT's procurement activities on behalf of SBIG continue. It was due to such

6. (U) Action Request: Request Embassy Beijing approach appropriate host government officials to deliver talking points in paragraph 7 and request that they begin talking points/non-paper:

7. (S) Begin talking points/non-paper:

(SECRET//REL CHINA)

-- On many occasions since February 2006, we have discussed with you our serious concerns regarding the proliferation-related trading activities.

-- In November 2008 we advised you that Karl Lee, the commercial manager of LIMMT, was planning a late October 2008 delivery of accelerometers.

-- We also informed you that additional monthly shipments would be prepared for delivery to MODAFL, and that as of September 2008, arrangements were being made for the delivery of such shipments.

-- We further advised you that LIMMT and SBIG were discussing the possible purchase of a computer numerical controlled (CNC) cold flow forming machine.

-- We now have additional information to share with you regarding this matter.

-- Specifically, we understand that as of late December 2008, SBIG continued to receive consignments of tungsten copper, graphite and aluminum.

-- In addition, Karl Lee provided SBIG a quotation for a model 3GFF-700 cold flow forming machine.

-- This machine is capable of producing ballistic missile components such as re-entry vehicle shells and solid rocket motor cases, and is currently in use by SBIG.

-- We also understand that as of late December 2008, LIMMT had supplied a quantity of gyroscopes and accelerometers to SBIG via Iran's Ministry of Defense.

-- The MODAFL office likely had plans to send another shipment of gyroscopes and accelerometers to SBIG in early January 2009 by having a visit to the MODAFL office.

-- We note in this context the requirement (per OP 6 of UNSCR 1737) that States shall take the necessary measures to prevent Iran from receiving such items.

-- We wanted to share this information with you to emphasize that LIMMT's procurement activities on behalf of SBIG continue. It was due to such

-- UNSCRs 1737, 1747, and 1803 require states to take the necessary measures to prevent the supply of certain MTCR- and NSG-controlled items to Iran.

-- In addition, OP 4 of UNSCR 1737 requires States to prevent the transfer to Iran of any item that State determines would contribute to the development of Iran's nuclear, chemical, biological, or ballistic missile capabilities.

-- We strongly urge you to investigate these activities immediately and to take steps to curtail LIMMT's operations, especially with UNSCR-designated entities.

-- We look forward to future cooperation on nonproliferation issues and to hearing of the actions your government takes in response to this information.

End talking points/non-paper.

8. (U) Department POC is ISN/MTR John Paul Herrmann (Phone: 202-647-1430). Please slug any reporting on this issue for ISN and EAP.

9. (U) A word version of this document will be posted at [http://www.aftenposten.no/spesial/wikileaksdokumenter/article3988461.ece](#).
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